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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
opportunity to defend against a stale claim were satisfied herein.7 The
presence of excessive radiation in and on the plaintiffs and their prop-
erty and the availability of investigative reports confirming contamina-
tion from a defective isotope,8 like the surgical clamps in Flanagan,
precluded questions of credibility or professional diagnostic judgment.
It followed that this evidence obviated the danger of a specious claim
as to the defective nature of the isotope and entitled the plaintiffs to
the opportunity to prove a causal connection between the radiation
and the injuries upon trial.0
LeVine is an equitable result for plaintiffs unknowingly subjected
to radiation injuries.
To bar plaintiffs from bringing their law suit before any mani-
festation of injury [would be], on the facts presented, unwar-
ranted.... To hold otherwise would, in many radiation injury
cases, insulate the defendants from any liability either for breach
of warranty... or negligence. 10
In addition, LeVine portends the adoption of the discovery rule in mal-
practice and negligence cases where a foreign substance is introduced
into the body and there is a substantial delay before a resultant injury
can be detected."
CPLR 217: Petitioner must commence proceeding for writ of prohibi-
tion within a time "reasonably necessary to protect his rights."
In Roberts v. County Court of Wyoming County,12 the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, became the first appellate tribunal13
in New York to determine whether CPLR 217's four-month statute of
limitations for proceedings against a body or officer applies to a pro-
ceeding for a writ of prohibition. Prohibition is an extraordinary dis-
7 70 Misc. 2d at 751, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
8 An independent investigation by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1970 confirmed
that the source of the contamination was the type of isotope which the defendants had
delivered to the co-plaintiff in 1963. Id. at 748-49, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
9 Id. at 751, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
10 Id. at 752, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
11 See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J. 72, Oct. 13, 1972, at 4, col. 2.
Significantly, as the court pointed out, the Legislature has recognized the insidious
nature of radiation-induced injuries and extended the ordinary time limitations for
recovery of workmen's compensation benefits for such injuries. They are available, inter
alia, for disabilities caused by radiation when the injury is discovered, regardless of the
time of exposure, provided that an action is brought within 90 days after discovery. N.Y.
WoxMxFn's CoMp. LAW § 28 (McKinney 1970), § 40(2) (McKinney 1966).
12 39 App. Div. 2d 246, 8338 N.Y.S.2d 882 (4th Dep't 1972).
13 The court observed that "[ilt appears that the resolution of this question is a
matter of first impression for an appellate court in this State." Id. at 249, 338 N.Y.S.2d
at 886.
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cretionary remedy which is available to restrain a court from hearing
an action when it has no jurisdiction to do so, or from exceeding its
powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction. 4 In the instant
case, the petitioner, the District Attorney for Bronx County, sought to
prevent a county judge from issuing a writ of habeas corpus for a sanity
hearing in another county, contending that such action would con-
stitute an overextension of his power. The proceeding was commenced
more than five months after the county judge had issued his order.
In assessing the applicability of CPLR 217, the court acknowl-
edged a division of opinion on the issue. One authority'r maintains
that, although the four-month provision is a general statute of limita-
tions applicable to all article 78 proceedings,' 6 the writ of prohibition
was intended to be excluded17 under CPA 1286, the predecessor of
CPLR 217.18 Another 9 contends that the section expressly applies to
prohibition.20 A third2' argues that, although the limitation period is
operable in such proceedings, it may have no actual effect because
of the uncertainty as to when it begins to run.
The Roberts court, in dictum,22 adopted the rule that the court
14 See Hogan v. Court of General Sessions, 296 N.Y. 1, 68 NE.2d 849 (1946); Culver
Contracting Corp. v. Humphrey, 268 N.Y. 26, 196 N.E. 627 (1935).
'5 8 WK&M 7804.02.1 6 Article 78 establishes the uniform procedure for the common-law writs of certiorari
to review, mandamus, and prohibition. See CPLR 7801.
17 See TrauR ANNUAL REPoRT oF TnE N.Y. JuDicLAL COUNCIL 183 (1937), wherein it is
stated: "There is no need for applying a time limitation to what are now prohibition
proceedings, for they are preventive remedies."
18 The authority contends that, since CPLR 217 re-enacted CPA 1286 without sub-
stantial change, the exclusion of prohibition under that section (see note 17 supra) was
intended to be continued. However, CPA 1286 applied to a proceeding "to review a
determination, or to compel performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law" (referring
to certiorari and mandamus, respectively), while CPLR 217 applies to "a proceeding
against a body or officer." The inference from this legislative modification of language is
that the present provision is meant to apply to all three writs embodied in article 78
proceedings against a body or officer.
19 24 CARIODY-WArr 2d, § 145:238, at 11 (1968). The author states, however, that the
matter
is usually academic, because a person in the position of needing relief by pro-
hibition will normally act immediately, because he will not want to be faced with
the accomplishment of that which he seeks to restrain.
20 See Feldman v. Matthews, 32 Misc. 2d 996, 223 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1962) (holding that prohibition is within the four-month limitation of CPA
1286); note 18 supra.
21 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 217, commentary at 508 (1972).
22 The court's precise holding is somewhat unclear. Justice Goldman stated that, were
it necessary to hold that the proceeding was time-barred, he would have done so. 39 App.
Div. 2d at 250, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 887. He subsequently held that the county judge whom the
petitioner had sought to restrain had not exceeded his powers in granting the habeas
corpus writ. Id. at 251, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 887. The court stated earlier that the petitioner's
application for the writ of prohibition should be denied because he had not taken advan-
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in its discretion should determine the applicable period of limitations
on the basis of the facts in each case, and that the proceeding should
be barred if not commenced by the petitioner within a time "reason-
ably necessary to protect his rights." 23 Here, said the unanimous court,
the proceeding would not be maintainable because "[t]he District At-
torney is not an unsophisticated litigant and should be expected to act
promptly"24 in such a situation.
Thus, litigants are forewarned not to presume that no time
limitation will apply to a petition for a writ of prohibition. If a point
in time at which the improper assumption of jurisdiction took place
can be pinpointed, the application will be barred if not seasonably
made.
ARTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): Attorney cannot predicate jurisdiction in action
against client on attorney's legal services in state for client.
Under CPLR 302(a)(1) a nonresident who individually or through
an agent "transacts any business within the state" is subject to in
personam jurisdiction. In Perlman v. Martin,25 the plaintiff, a New
York attorney, sought recovery of legal fees for professional services
allegedly rendered in New York for the defendant, a nondomiciliary,
and contended that personal jurisdiction over the defendant could be
exercised pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) on the basis of the plaintiff's
performance of legal services here.
Finding that the mere performance of such services was not an
independent basis for long-arm jurisdiction,26 the Supreme Court,
Nassau County, emphasized that a lawyer's role is that of an indepen-
dent contractor.27 Thus, the critical issue, as the court noted, was
whether the client himself engaged in purposeful activity within the
state.28 Finding the defendant's telephone calls from Washington to
New York to retain the plaintiff not a "transaction of business" pursu-
tage of the appeal procedure available to him as to the order granted by the county
judge. Id. at 249, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
23 Id. at 250, 333 N.YS&2d at 887.
24 Id.
25 70 Misc. 2d 169, 332 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (mem.).
26 Id. at 170, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
27 Id. at 171, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
281d., citing Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506,
208 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 145, 147
(1970); Reich v. Pines Hotel, 68 Misc. 2d 1001, 328 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray. 148, 183 (1972).
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